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11 Introduction
A major goal of evolutionary game theory is to clarify the connection between
the outcome of simple adaptive processes modelling the evolution of behavior
in populations of boundedly rational agents and equilibrium concepts. For
a fairly wide class of dynamics, it has been found that, if a solution con-
verges to a point and if initially all pure strategies are played with positive
probability, then this point is a Nash equilibrium. Similarly, weak dynamic
stability (Lyapunov stability) implies Nash equilibrium behavior (Weibull,
1995). On the other hand, evolutionary dynamics need not lead to Nash
equilibria. For instance, in a version of the child game Rock-Paper-Scissors,
the replicator dynamics does not converge to the unique Nash equilibrium,
but cycles outward towards the boundary of the state space (Zeeman, 1980;
Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998). Non-convergence to Nash equilibria is a uni-
versal phenomenon: for any dynamics satisfying some minimal adaptivity
and regularity conditions, there are games with a unique Nash equilibrium
and such that, for an open set of initial conditions, the solution does not
converge to the equilibrium but cycles (Hofbauer and Swinkels, unpublished;
Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998, section 8.6)1,2.
There are several ways to try to ﬁnd nonetheless a general connection
between evolutionary dynamics and equilibria. A ﬁrst possibility is to replace
convergence to the set of Nash equilibria by some weaker connection, like
convergence in time-average or simply a connection between strategies that
survive and strategies that are played in equilibrium. The latter works for
games with few strategies: under the single-population replicator dynamics,
for any 3×3 symmetric game and any interior initial condition, all strategies
that do not belong to the support of any Nash equilibrium are eliminated.
This follows from Bomze’s (1983) classiﬁcation of the replicator dynamics’
phase portraits in 3 × 3 symmetric games. The same result holds for the
best-response dynamics (Viossat, 2005, chapter 9a).
Another possibility is to replace Nash equilibrium by a weaker concept.
The main current candidate would probably be correlated equilibrium. In-
deed, recent articles surveyed by Hart (2005) show that simple adaptive pro-
1This holds for every myopic adjustment dynamics (Swinkels, 1993) whose vector ﬁeld
depends smoothly on the payoﬀ matrix of the game.
2We are interested here in evolutionary dynamics, but we stress that other types of
adaptive processes more readily lead to approximate Nash equilibrium behavior. See e.g.
Young (2004) and Foster and Young (2006).
2cesses converge to the set of correlated equilibria, at least in a time-average
sense. Though these processes are not evolutionary dynamics, this suggest
that correlated equilibrium might be better related to the outcome of evolu-
tionary dynamics than Nash equilibrium.
Again, in small dimension, some positive results can be obtained. For
instance, in 3 × 3 symmetric games, under the single- or two-population
replicator dynamics and for any interior initial condition, all strategies that
do not belong to the support of any correlated equilibrium are eliminated
(Viossat, 2005, chapter 9b).3 The same result holds for the best-response
dynamics, and for any convex monotonic dynamics, in the sense of Hofbauer
and Weibull (1996).
However, for games with more strategies, even such a weak connection
between correlated equilibrium and the outcome of evolutionary dynamics
cannot be found. Indeed, for the single-population replicator dynamics, there
are 4 × 4 symmetric games for which, for an open set of initial conditions,
all strategies belonging to the support of at least one correlated equilibrium
are eliminated; thus, only strategies that do not take part in any correlated
equilibrium remain (Viossat, 2006). It follows that no kind of time-average
of the replicator dynamics converges to the set of correlated equilibria.
The purpose of this article is to show that elimination of all strategies
used in correlated equilibrium is a robust phenomenon; that is, it does not
only occur for the replicator dynamics and very speciﬁc games, but for many
dynamics and for an open set of games.
The games we study are 4×4 symmetric games built by adding a strategy
to an outward-cycling Rock-Paper-Scissors game and assuming some payoﬀ
inequalities. Under the replicator dynamics and the best-response dynamics,
the attractor of the underlying Rock-Paper-Scissors game is asymptotically
stable in the augmented, 4 × 4 game. This is in spite of the fact that, for
an open set of such games, the unique strategy belonging to the support of
a correlated equilibrium is the added, fourth strategy. It follows that, for
the replicator dynamics and the best-response dynamics, there is an open set
of games for which, for an open set of initial conditions, all strategies used
in correlated equilibrium are eliminated. This is also true of (i) a family of
dynamics including the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics; (ii) any mono-
3The reason why this does not follow from the above stated result on Nash equilibrium
is that we now consider two-population dynamics, so that the state space has no longer
dimension 2 but 4.
3tonic or weakly sign-preserving dynamics in which no new strategy arises by
mutation, and whose vector ﬁeld depends continuously on the payoﬀs. Our
proofs for these dynamics apply to a smaller open set of games than for the
replicator dynamics and the best-response dynamics.
An issue is that our results might rest on the implicit assumption that
agents play pure strategies.4 To address this issue, we consider the following
model, taken from Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998, section 7.2): there is a basic
strategic situation, modelled by a ﬁnite normal form game, called the base
game. The population is divided in a ﬁnite number of types of agents, and
each type plays a pure or mixed strategy of the base game. Selection acts
on types. Thus, the true game, i.e., the game in which selection operates, is
the game whose pure strategies are the types and whose payoﬀs are induced
by the base game payoﬀs. We assume that every pure strategy of the base
game is played by one type of agent, but that otherwise we do not know
which types of agents are present, nor the number of types. The question is
whether we can nonetheless be sure that, in the true game, all strategies used
in correlated equilibrium are eliminated for an open set of initial conditions,
or whether this depends on the types that are present. We show that, at least
for the replicator dynamics and the best-response dynamics, elimination of
all strategies used in correlated equilibrium is robust in this sense.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The games studied
throughout are introduced in section 2. Section 3 and the appendix show
that, under the replicator dynamics, elimination of all pure strategies used
in correlated equilibrium occurs for an open set of games (section 3). The
same result is then shown to hold for the best-response dynamics (section
4), a family of dynamics including the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics
(section 5) and for monotonic or weakly sign-preserving dynamics (section
6). Section 7 studies the robustness of these results when agents can play
mixed strategies. Finally, section 8 concludes.
We ﬁrst introduce the framework and the notations.
Framework and notations. We study single-population dynamics
in two-player, ﬁnite symmetric games. The set of pure strategies is I =
{1,2,..,N} and SN denotes the simplex of mixed strategies (henceforth, “the
simplex”). Its vertices ei, 1 ≤ i ≤ N, correspond to the pure strategies of the
game. We denote by xi(t) the proportion of the population playing strategy i
4Note that in Hart and Mas-Collel’s (2003) model, agents play mixed strategies.
4at time t and by x(t) = (x1(t),...,xN(t)) ∈ SN the population proﬁle (or mean
strategy). We study its evolution under dynamics of type ˙ x(t) = f(x(t),U),
where U = (uij)1≤i,j≤4 is the payoﬀ matrix of the game. We often skip the
indication of time. For every x in SN, the probability distribution on I × I
induced by x is denoted by x ⊗ x.
We assume known the deﬁnition of a correlated equilibrium distribution
(Aumann, 1974) and, with a slight abuse of vocabulary, we write throughout
correlated equilibrium for correlated equilibrium distribution. A pure strat-
egy i is used in correlated equilibrium if there exists a correlated equilibrium
µ under which strategy i has positive marginal probability (since the game is
symmetric, whether we restrict attention to symmetric correlated equilibria
or not is irrelevant; see footnote 2 in (Viossat, 2006)). Finally, the pure strat-
egy i is eliminated (for a given solution x(·) of a given dynamics) if xi(t) → 0
as t → +∞.
2 A family of games with a unique correlated
equilibrium
A RPS (Rock-Paper-Scissors) game is a 3 × 3 symmetric game


a1 b2 c3
c1 a2 b3
b1 c2 a3

 (1)
in which the second strategy (Paper) beats the ﬁrst (Rock), the third (Scis-
sors) beats the second, and the ﬁrst beats the third. That is,
bi < ai < ci for i = 1,2,3. (2)
For i = 1,2,3, let
αi = ai − bi , βi = ci − ai. (3)
Every RPS game has a unique Nash equilibrium: (ˆ n, ˆ n), where
ˆ n =
1
Σ
(α2α3 + α3β2 + α2β3,α1α3 + α1β3 + β3β1,α1α2 + α2β1 + β1β2), (4)
with Σ > 0 such that ˆ n ∈ S3 (see Zeeman, 1980; Gaunersdorfer and Hofbauer,
1995, or Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998). It was shown in (Viossat, 2006) that
ˆ n ⊗ ˆ n is actually the unique correlated equilibrium of the game.
5We say that a RPS game is outward cycling if
3 Y
i=1
αi >
3 Y
i=1
βi. (5)
In that case, under the replicator dynamics, the unique Nash equilibrium
is dynamically unstable, and for every initial condition diﬀerent from the
Nash equilibrium, the solution of the replicator dynamics converges to the
boundary of the simplex (Zeeman, 1980).
The games we consider are 4 × 4 symmetric games built by adding a
strategy to an outward cycling RPS game. That is, letting
U =

  

a1 b2 c3 d1
c1 a2 b3 d2
b1 c2 a3 d3
f1 f2 f3 a4

  

(6)
denote the payoﬀ matrix of the row player, and deﬁning αi and βi as in (3)
for i = 1,2,3, we assume that αi and βi are positive and that equation (5) is
satisﬁed.
In addition, we assume that near the vertices e1,e2,e3 of the simplex S4,
strategy 4 earns strictly less than the mean payoﬀ. That is,
fi < ai for i = 1,2,3. (7)
In particular, there is a best-response cycle from e1 to e2 to e3 and back to
e1.
We now state our ﬁrst results. Consider a 4×4 symmetric game satisfying
(2). Let n = (ˆ n1, ˆ n2, ˆ n3,0) where ˆ n = (ˆ n1, ˆ n2, ˆ n3), deﬁned in (4), is the Nash
equilibrium of the underlying RPS game.5
Proposition 1 If d1 = d2 = d3 < a4 and e4 · Un > n · Un then the game
has a unique correlated equilibrium: e4 ⊗ e4.
Proof. The proof is a straightforward extension of the proof of proposition
1 in (Viossat, 2006) and so we omit it.
Proposition 2 (Viossat, 2005a, proposition 1) The set of ﬁnite games
with a unique correlated equilibrium is open.
5Instead of n, the notation n123 was used in (Viossat, 2006).
6A simple example of a game satisfying conditions (2), (5) and (7), and the
conditions of proposition 1 is:
Example 3
Uα =


 

0 −1  −α
 0 −1 −α
−1  0 −α
−1+
3 + α −1+
3 + α −1+
3 + α 0


 

(8)
with  in ]0,1[, and 0 < α < (1 − )/3.
It follows from example 3 and propositions 1 and 2 that:
Corollary 2.1 There exists an open set of 4×4 symmetric games satisfying
(2), (5) and (7) and with e4 ⊗ e4 as unique correlated equilibrium.
We can now precise the outline of the article. The next two sections show
that, for any game satisfying (2), (5) and (7), and for an open set of initial
conditions, the replicator dynamics and the best-response dynamics eliminate
strategy 4. Sections (5) and (6) deal with the Brown-von Neumann-Nash
dynamics and with any monotonic or weakly sign-preserving dynamics sat-
isfying some standard regularity conditions; elimination of strategy 4, for an
open set of initial conditions, is shown to occur in any game in a neighborhood
of (8), provided that α is small enough for the Brown-von Neumann-Nash
dynamics, and that  is small enough for monotonic of weakly sign-preserving
dynamics.
3 Replicator dynamics
The replicator dynamics (Taylor and Jonker, 1978) is given by
˙ xi(t) = xi(t)[(Ux(t))i − x(t) · Ux(t)].
Its behavior in example 3 was studied in (Viossat, 2006). It was shown that,
under the replicator dynamics and for α small enough, even though strategy
4 is the unique strategy used in correlated equilibrium, this strategy is elim-
inated for an open set of initial conditions. The purpose of this section is to
give a more general proof of this fact and to show that the same result holds
for an open set of games. We ﬁrst need a deﬁnition:
7Deﬁnition Let C be a closed subset of S4. The set C is asymptotically stable
if it is:
(a) invariant: x(0) ∈ C ⇒ (∀t ∈ R,x(t) ∈ C)
(b) Lyapunov stable: for every neighborhood N1 of C, there exists a
neighborhood N2 of C such that, for every initial solution x(0) in N2, x(t) ∈
N1 for all t ≥ 0.
(c) locally attracting: there exists a neighborhood N of C such that, for
every initial condition x(0) in N, minc∈C ||x(t)−c|| →t→+∞ 0 (where ||·|| is
any norm on R
I).
Let
Γ = {x ∈ S4,x4 = 0 and x1x2x3 = 0}. (9)
Proposition 4 For every 4 × 4 symmetric game (6) satisfying (2), (5) and
(7), the set Γ is asymptotically stable.
Proof. The intuition is that, due to (5), the solution spirals outward as
long as x4 is low, and that, due to (7), if the initial condition is close to Γ,
x4 will never increase substantially and will eventually decrease to 0. The
formal proof consists in checking that the stability criteria for heteroclinic
cycles developed by Hofbauer (1994) are satisﬁed. As these criteria will be
introduced in section 6, the proof is postponed and given in the appendix.
Together with corollary 2.1, proposition 4 implies that there exists an
open set of 4 × 4 symmetric games for which, from an open set of initial
conditions, the unique strategy used in correlated equilibrium is eliminated.
Note that not all games satisfying (2), (5) and (7) have e4 ⊗e4 as unique
correlated equilibrium or even unique Nash equilibrium. Actually, proposi-
tion 4 provides an example of a family of games with a common attractor
but very diﬀerent sets of Nash equilibria6. The point is that this attractor, Γ,
is bounded away from the set of equilibria and that its asymptotic stability
only depends on the payoﬀs in its neighbourhood. This explains why the
6For instance, assuming throughout that (2), (5) and (7) are satisﬁed: if the fi are low
enough, then the Nash equilibrium of the underlying RPS game induces a Nash equilibrium
of (6). If d1 = d2 = d3 > a4 and if the fi are high enough, then there is a unique symmetric
Nash equilibrium, which is a convex combination of e4 and of the Nash equilibrium of
the underlying RPS game, and there is an inﬁnity of asymmetric Nash equilibria [to see
that there is a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium, mimick the proof of proposition 3 in
(Viossat, 2006)]. If di < a4 for all i and if d2 and d3 are low enough (with respect to d1
and f1), then there is a Nash equilibrium in the interior of the edge [e1,e4], etc.
8stability of Γ is in a large part unrelated to the structure of the equilibrium
set.
4 Best-response dynamics
4.1 Main result
The best-response dynamics (Gilboa and Matsui, 1991; Matsui, 1992) is given
by the diﬀerential inclusion:
˙ x(t) ∈ BR(x(t)) − x(t), (10)
where BR(x) is the set of best responses to x:
BR(x) = {y ∈ SN : y · Ux = max
z∈SN
z · Ux}.
A solution x(·) of the best-response dynamics is an absolutely continuous
function satisfying (10) for almost every t. In general, there might be several
solutions starting from the same initial condition. However, for the games
and the initial conditions that we will consider, there is a unique solution
starting from each initial condition.7
Consider a 4 × 4 symmetric game with payoﬀ matrix (6) satisfying (2),
(5) and (7). Let
V (x) := max
1≤i≤3
"
(Ux)i −
X
1≤i≤4
aixi
#
and W(x) := max(x4,|V (x)|). (11)
The set
ST := {x ∈ S4 : W(x) = 0} (12)
is a triangle, which, following Gaunersdorfer and Hofbauer (1995), we call
the Shapley triangle. Gaunersdorfer and Hofbauer (1995) show that in the
underlying RPS game, this triangle attracts all solutions of (10) except the
one starting and remaining at the Nash equilibrium. Here, we show that in
the full 4 × 4 game, this triangle still attracts all solutions from an open set
of initial conditions.
7We focus on forward time and so never study whether a solution is uniquely deﬁned
in backward time.
9Proposition 5 Consider a 4 × 4 symmetric game satisfying (2), (5) and
(7). If strategy 4 is not a best response to x(0) and if strategies 1, 2 and 3
are not all best responses to x(0), then for all t ≥ 0, x(t) is uniquely deﬁned,
and x(t) converges to the Shapley triangle (12) as t → +∞. 8
Proof. We begin with a lemma, which is the continuous time version of the
improvement principle of Monderer and Sela (1997):
Lemma 4.1 (Improvement principle) Let t1 < t2, let b be a best re-
sponse to x(t1) and let b
0 ∈ S4. Assume that ˙ x = b − x (hence the solution
points towards b) for all t in ]t1,t2[. If b
0 is a best response to x(t2) then
b
0 · Ub ≥ b · Ub, with strict inequality if b
0 is not a best response to x(t1).
Proof of lemma 4.1. Between t1 and t2, the solution points towards b.
Therefore, there exists λ in ]0,1[ such that
x(t2) = λx(t1) + (1 − λ)b. (13)
If b
0 is a best response to x(t2) then (b
0−b)·Ux(t2) ≥ 0 so that, substituting
the right-hand-side of (13) for x(t2), we get:
(1 − λ)(b
0 − b) · Ub ≥ λ(b − b
0) · Ux(t1). (14)
Since b is a best response to x(t1), the right hand side of (14) is nonnegative,
and positive if b
0 is not a best response to x(t1). The result follows.
Now ﬁx a solution x(·) with initial condition satisfying the conditions of
proposition 5. Using lemma 4.1, it is easy to see that, at least for some time,
the solution x(t) is uniquely deﬁned and has the following behavior: assume
for concreteness that at time t, strategy 1 is the unique best response to
x(t); the solution will then point towards e1 till some time t0 > t when some
other pure strategy becomes a best response. Due to the improvement prin-
ciple (lemma 4.1), this strategy can only be strategy 2. Thus, the solution
must then point towards the edge [e1,e2]. Since strategy 2 strictly dominates
strategy 1 in the game restricted to {1,2} × {1,2}, it follows that, immedi-
ately after time T, strategy 2 becomes the unique best response; therefore
8Note that for any game in a neighborhood of game (8), the former condition implies
the latter: if strategy 4 is not a best-response to x ∈ S4, then strategy 1, 2, and 3 are
not all best-responses to x. This is because in game (8), strategy 4 earns a strictly higher
payoﬀ than (1/3,1/3,1/3,0). Proposition 5 applies to much more general games, in which
the ﬁrst condition need not imply the second.
10the solution will actually point towards e2. The solution keeps pointing to-
wards e2 till some other pure strategy becomes a best response; due to the
improvement principle, this strategy must be strategy 3. The solution then
changes direction, and points towards e3 till 1 becomes a best response again,
and so on.
To show that this behavior continues for ever, it suﬃces to show that the
times at which the direction of the trajectory changes do not accumulate.
This is the object of the following claim, which will be proved in the end:
Claim 4.2 The time length between two successive times when the direction
of x(t) changes is bounded away from zero.
Now recall the deﬁnition of the functions V and W in (11), and let v(t) =
V (x(t)), w(t) = W(x(t)). When x(t) points towards ei (with i ∈ {1,2,3}),
we have:
˙ v = (U˙ x)i −
X
1≤j≤4
aj ˙ xj = (U(ei − x))i −
 
ai −
X
1≤j≤4
ajxj
!
= −v (15)
and we also have ˙ x4 = −x4; therefore ˙ w = −w. Since for almost time t, x(t)
points towards e1, e2 or e3, it follows that ˙ w(t) = −w(t) holds for almost all
t, hence that w(t) decreases exponentially to 0. Therefore, x(t) converges to
the Shapley triangle.
To complete the proof, we still need to prove claim 4.2:
Proof of claim 4.2: In what follows i ∈ {1,2,3} and i+1 is counted modulo
3. Fix an initial condition and let
g(t) := max
1≤i,j≤3
[(Ux(t))i − (Ux(t))j]
denote the maximum diﬀerence between the payoﬀs of strategies in {1,2,3}.
This may be seen as a measure of the distance between x(t) and the set of
points x such that (Ux)1 = (Ux)2 = (Ux)3. Let tk
i denote the kth time at
which strategy i becomes a best response and choose i such that tk
i < tk
i+1.
Let x = x(tk
i), g = g(tk
i) and x0 = x(tk
i+1), g0 = g(tk
i+1). We now compute g0
as a function of g.
Between tk
i and tk
i+1, the solution points towards ei. Therefore, there
exists λ in ]0,1[ such that
x
0 = λei + (1 − λ)x. (16)
11Furthermore, by deﬁnition of tk
i and tk
i+1,
(Ux)i−1 = (Ux)i = (Ux)i+1 + g (17)
and
(Ux
0)i = (Ux
0)i+1 = (Ux
0)i−1 + g
0. (18)
Using in this order (18), (16) and (17), we get:
0 = (Ux
0)i+1 − (Ux
0)i = (ei+1 − ei) · Ux
0
= (ei+1 − ei) · U(λei + (1 − λ)x)
= λ(ci − ai) − (1 − λ)g
and
g
0 = (ei − ei−1) · Ux
0 = (ei − ei−1) · U(λei + (1 − λ)x) = λ(ai − bi).
Solving for g0 we get g0/g = αi/(g + βi) with, as deﬁned in (3), αi = ai − bi
and βi = ci − ai. Iterating this argument, we obtain the return map:
g(t
k+1
i ) =
α1α2α3
β1β2β3 + g(ti
k)(α1α2 + α1β3 + β2β3)
g(t
k
i).
Since, by (5), α1α2α3 > β1β2β3, it follows that for small g(tk
i), we have
g(t
k+1
i ) > g(tk
i); therefore g(tk
i) is bounded away from zero. Now, since
(Ux(t))i − (Ux(t))i+1 decreases from g(tk
i) to 0 between tk
i and tk
i+1, and
since the speed at which this quantity varies is bounded, it follows that
tk
i+1 − tk
i is bounded away from zero too. That is, the time length between
two successive times at which the direction of x(t) changes is bounded away
from zero. This proves claim 4.2 and completes the proof of proposition 5.
Together with corollary 2.1, proposition 5 implies that there exists an
open set of 4×4 symmetric games for which the unique strategy used in cor-
related equilibrium is strategy 4, but, from an open set of initial conditions,
the solution x(·) of (10) is uniquely deﬁned and x4(t) → 0 as t → +∞.
4.2 Remarks
This section is independent of the next sections and may be skipped.
12Remark 1. For every η > 0, we may set the parameters of (6) so that the
set {x ∈ S4 : e4 ∈ BR(x) or {e1,e2,e3} ⊆ BR(x)} has Lebesgue measure
less than η. In this sense, the basin of attraction of the Shapley triangle may
be made arbitrarily large.
Remark 2. When d1 = d2 = d3 the behavior of the best-response dynamics
in the 4×4 game (6) can be precisely related to its behavior in the underlying
RPS game (1), which was fully analyzed by Gaunersdorfer and Hofbauer
(1995). Indeed, for x 6= e4 and i in {1,2,3}, let ˆ xi denote the proportion of
the population playing strategy i relative to the proportion of the population
playing strategy 1, 2 or 3:
ˆ xi =
xi
x1 + x2 + x3
Let ˆ x = (ˆ x1, ˆ x2, ˆ x3) ∈ S3. Since d1 = d2 = d3, it follows that, provided
that 4 is not a best response to x, the strategies i in {1,2,3} which are
best responses to x are exactly those which are best responses to ˆ x in the
underlying RPS game. This implies that, up to a change of velocity, ˆ x follows
the best-response dynamics in the underlying RPS game. More precisely,
straightforward computations show that if 4 is not a best response to x then:
˙ x ∈ BR(x) − x ⇒ (1 − x4)˙ ˆ x ∈ BR(ˆ x) − ˆ x.
A similar result holds for the replicator dynamics (Viossat, 2006, lemma 5.1).
Remark 3. The proof of proposition 5 uses condition (7), i.e., fi < ai
for i = 1,2,3. Since (Ux)4 −
P
1≤i≤4 aixi =
P
1≤i≤3(fi − ai)xi is linear in
x, condition (7) means that (Ux)4 −
P
1≤i≤4 aixi is negative on the face of
the simplex spanned by e1,e2,e3. If instead of requiring (7), we only require
that (Ux)4 −
P
1≤i≤4 aixi be negative on the Shapley triangle:
W(x) = 0 ⇒ (Ux)4 −
X
1≤i≤4
aixi < 0. (19)
then proposition 5 does not hold.9 However, strategy 4 is still eliminated
from an open set of initial conditions:
9For instance, if f1 > a1, f3 < a3 and d1 = d2 = d3 < a4, then from every initial
condition suﬃciently close to the mixed strategy x ∈ [e3,e4] to which strategies 1 and 4
are both best responses, including initial conditions to which strategy 1 is the unique best
response, every solution of (10) converges to e4.
13Proposition 6 If (19) holds, then there exists γ > 0 such that from every
initial condition in Nγ := {x ∈ S4 : W(x) < γ}, there is a unique solution to
(10), and it converges to the Shapley triangle.
Proof. If we can ﬁnd γ > 0 such that in Nγ strategy 4 is never a best
response, then the proof of proposition 5 implies that, as long as x(t) ∈ Nγ,
the solution is unique and W(x(t)) decreases exponentially. The later implies
that Nγ is forward invariant and that W goes to zero, hence the result.
Now, in light of the deﬁnition (11) of W, (19) means that on the Shapley
triangle, strategy 4 is never a best response. Therefore, if (19) holds, then
there exists an open neighborhood Ω of the Shapley triangle on which 4 is not
a best response. Since W is positive on the compact set S4\Ω, it follows that
γ := minx∈S4\Ω W(x) is positive. Furthermore, the deﬁnition of γ implies
that Nγ ⊆ Ω; hence, in Nγ, strategy 4 is never a best response and the result
follows.
Following Gaunersdorfer and Hofbauer (1995), it is interesting to com-
pare the behavior of the best-response dynamics and of the time-average of
the replicator dynamics. If fi > ai for some i ∈ {1,2,3}, then under the
replicator dynamics, the set Γ is not stable10. But
Proposition 7 If (19) holds, then under the replicator dynamics, Γ attracts
an open set of orbits, along which the time-average converges to the Shapley
triangle.
Proof. This follows from proposition 3.1 of Brannath (1994). A sketch of
proof in this particular case is given in (Viossat, 2005b, chapter 10, part B,
second appendix)
5 Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics
The Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics (henceforth BNN) is given by:
˙ xi = ki(x) − xi
X
j∈I
kj(x) (20)
where
ki(x) := max(0,(Ux)i − x · Ux) (21)
10Neither asymptotically stable nor Lyapunov stable.
14is the excess payoﬀ of strategy i over the average payoﬀ. As in the best-
response dynamics, strategies that are initially absent may appear, the pro-
portion of every strategy earning less than average decreases and the rest-
points are exactly the Nash equilibria of the game.11 Furthermore, since
the right-hand side of (20) is Lipschitz continuous, BNN has a unique solu-
tion from each initial condition. We refer to (Hofbauer, 2000; Berger and
Hofbauer, 2006) and references therein for a motivation of and results on
BNN.
Let G0 denote the game (8) with α = 0. Recall that U0 denote its payoﬀ
matrix. The mixed strategy corresponding to the Nash equilibrium of the
underlying RPS game is n =
 
1
3, 1
3, 1
3,0

and it may be shown that the set of
symmetric Nash equilibria of G0 is the segment E0 = [n,e4]. That is, (p,p)
is a Nash equilibrium if and only if p is a convex combination of n and e4.12
This section is devoted to a proof of the following proposition:
Proposition 8 If C is a closed subset of S4 disjoint from E0, then there
exists a neighborhood of G0 such that, for every game in this neighborhood
and every initial condition in C, x4(t) → 0 as t → +∞.
Propositions 1 and 2 imply that any neighborhood of the game G0 contains
an open set of games for which the unique correlated equilibrium is e4 ⊗
e4. Together with proposition 9, this implies that there exists an open set
of games for which, under BNN, the unique strategy played in correlated
equilibrium is eliminated from an open set of initial conditions.
The essence of the proof of proposition 9 is to show that, for games
close to G0, there is a “tube” surrounding E0 such that: (i) the tube repels
solutions coming from outside; (ii) outside of the tube, strategy 4 earns less
than average, hence x4 decreases. We ﬁrst show that in G0 the segment E0
is locally repelling.
The function
V0(x) :=
1
2
X
i∈I
k
2
i =
1
2
X
i∈I
[max(0,(U0x)i − x · U0x)]
2
is continuous, nonnegative and equals 0 exactly on the symmetric Nash equi-
libria, i.e. on E0, so that V0(x) may be seen as a distance from x to E0. Fix
an initial condition and let v0(t) := V0(x(t)).
11The symmetric Nash equilibria, for the single-population version presented here.
12The game G0 has other, asymmetric equilibria, but they will play no role.
15Lemma 5.1 There exists an open neighborhood Neq of E0 such that, under
BNN in the game G0, ˙ v0(t) > 0 whenever x(t) ∈ Neq\E0.
Proof. It is easily checked that:
n · U0x = e4 · U0x ∀x ∈ S4 (22)
(that is, n and e4 always earn the same payoﬀ) and
(x − x
0) · U0e4 = (x − x
0) · U0n = 0 ∀x ∈ S4,∀x
0 ∈ S4 (23)
(that is, against e4 [resp. n], all strategies earn the same payoﬀ). Further-
more, as follows from lemma 4.1 in (Viossat, 2006), for every p in E0 and
every x / ∈ E0,
(x−p)·U0x = (x−p)·U0(x−p) =
1 − 
2
X
1≤i≤3

xi −
1 − x4
3
2
> 0. (24)
Hofbauer (2000) shows that the function v0 satisﬁes
˙ v0 = ¯ k
2 [(q − x) · U0(q − x) − (q − x) · U0x] (25)
with x = x(t), ¯ k =
P
i ki and qi = ki/¯ k. It follows from equation (23) that
if p ∈ E0, then against p all strategies earn the same payoﬀ. Therefore,
the second term (q − x) · U0x goes to 0 as x approaches E0. Thus, to
prove lemma 5.1, it suﬃces to show that as x approaches E0, the ﬁrst term
(q − x) · U0(q − x) is positive and bounded away from 0. But for x / ∈ E0,
min
1≤i≤3
(U0x)i ≤ n · U0x = (U0x)4 < x · U0x (26)
(the ﬁrst inequality holds because n is a convex combination of e1, e2 and
e3, the equality follows from (22) and the strict inequality from (24) applied
to p = e4). It follows from (U0x)4 < x · U0x that k4 = 0 hence q4 = 0;
similarly, it follows from min1≤i≤3(U0x)i < x · U0x that qi = 0 for some i in
{1,2,3}. Together with (24), this implies that for every p in E0,
(q − p) · U0(q − p) =
1 − 
2
X
1≤i≤3

qi −
1
3
2
≥
1 − 
18
.
This completes the proof.
16We now prove proposition 9. Consider ﬁrst the BNN dynamics in the
game G0. Recall lemma 5.1 and let
0 < δ < min
x∈S4\Neq
V0(x) (27)
(the latter is positive because V0 is positive on S4\E0, hence on S4\Neq, and
because S4\Neq is compact). Note that if V0(x) ≤ δ then x ∈ Neq. Therefore
it follows from lemma 5.1 and δ > 0 that
v0(t) = δ ⇒ ˙ v0(t) > 0. (28)
Let
Cδ := {x ∈ S4 : V0(x) ≥ δ}.
Since δ > 0, the sets Cδ and E0 are disjoint. Therefore, by (24) applied to
p = e4,
x ∈ Cδ ⇒ (U0x)4 − x · U0x < 0 (29)
so that x4 decreases strictly as long as x ∈ Cδ and x4 > 0. Since, by (28),
the set Cδ is forward invariant, it follows that for any initial condition in Cδ,
strategy 4 is eliminated.
Now let ∇V0(x) = (∂V0/∂xi)1≤i≤n (x) denote the gradient of V0 at x.
It is easy to see that V0 is C1. Therefore, it follows from (28), ˙ v0(t) =
∇V0(x(t)) · ˙ x(t) and compactness of {x ∈ S4 : V0(x) = δ} that
∃γ > 0,[v0(t) = δ ⇒ ˙ v0(t) ≥ γ > 0]. (30)
Similarly, since Cδ is compact, it follows from (29) that there exists γ0 > 0
such that
x ∈ Cδ ⇒ (U0x)4 − x · U0x ≤ −γ
0 < 0. (31)
Since ˙ x is Lipschitz in the payoﬀ matrix, it follows from (30) that for U
close enough to U0, we still have v0(t) = δ ⇒ ˙ v0 > 0 under the perturbed
dynamics. Similarly, due to (31), we still have x ∈ Cδ ⇒ (Ux)4−x·Ux < 0.
Therefore, the above reasoning applies and for every initial condition in Cδ,
strategy 4 is eliminated.
Note that δ can be chosen arbitrarily small (see (27)). Therefore, to
complete the proof of proposition 9, it suﬃces to show that if C is a compact
set disjoint from E0 then, for δ suﬃciently small, C ⊂ Cδ. But since V0 is
positive on S4\E0, and since C is compact and disjoint from E0, it follows
17that there exists δ0 > 0 such that, for all x in C, V0(x) ≥ δ0; hence, for all
δ ≤ δ0, C ⊂ Cδ. This completes the proof.
Hofbauer (2000, section 6) considers a generalization of the BNN dynam-
ics:
˙ xi = f(ki) − xi
n X
j=1
f(kj) (32)
where f : R+ → R+ is a continuous function with f(0) = 0 and f(u) > 0
for u > 0, and where ki is deﬁned as in (21). The results of this section
generalize straightforwardly to any such dynamics:
Proposition 9 Consider a dynamics of type (32). If C is a closed subset
of S4 disjoint from E0, then there exists a neighborhood of G0 such that, for
every game in this neighborhood and every initial condition in C, x4(t) → 0
as t → +∞.
Proof. Replace V0(x) by W0(x) :=
P
i F(ki(x)), where F is an anti-derivative
of f, and replace ki by f(ki). Let ¯ f =
P
i f(ki), ˜ fi = f(ki)/ ¯ f, and ˜ f = 
˜ fi

1≤i≤N
. Finally, let w0(t) = W0(x(t)). As shown by Hofbauer (2000),
˙ w0 = ¯ f
2
h
(˜ f − x) · U0(˜ f − x) − (˜ f − x) · U0x
i
which is the analogue of (25). Then apply exactly the same proof as for
BNN.
6 Monotonic and weakly sign-preserving dy-
namics
Consider a dynamics of the form
˙ xi = xigi(x) (33)
where the C1 functions gi have the property that
P
i∈I xigi(x) = 0 for all x
in S4, so that the simplex S4 and its boundary faces are invariant.
Such a dynamics is monotonic if the growth rates of the diﬀerent strategies
18are ranked according to their payoﬀs13:
gi(x) > gj(x) ⇔ (Ux)i > (Ux)j ∀i ∈ I,∀j ∈ I.
A dynamics of type (33) is weakly sign-preserving (WSP) (Ritzberger and
Weibull, 1995) if whenever a strategy earns below average, its growth rate is
negative:
[(Ux)i < x · Ux] ⇒ gi(x) < 0.
Finally,14 dynamics of type (33) implicitly depend on the payoﬀ matrix U.
Thus, a more correct writing of (33) would be:
˙ xi = xigi(x,U)
where U ∈ RN×N. Such a dynamics depends continuously on the payoﬀ
matrix if, for every i in I, the functions gi are deﬁned for an open set of payoﬀ
matrices and depend continuously on U. A prime example of a dynamics of
type (33) which is monotonic, WSP, and depends continuously on the payoﬀ
matrix is the replicator dynamics.
We now state the result: ﬁx a monotonic or WSP dynamics (33) that
depends continuously on the payoﬀ matrix.
Proposition 10 For every α in ]0,1/3[, there exists  > 0 such that for every
game in the neighborhood of (8), the set Γ deﬁned by (9) is asymptotically
stable.
Together with propositions 1 and 2 and example 3, this implies that there
exists an open set of games for which e4 ⊗ e4 is the unique correlated equi-
librium but strategy 4 is eliminated for an open set of initial conditions.
Proof. For every monotonic or WSP dynamics (33), and for every game in
the neighborhood of (8), the set Γ is an heteroclinic cycle. That is, a set
consisting of saddle rest points and of the saddle orbits connecting these rest
points. Thus we may use the asymptotic stability’s criteria for heteroclinic
13This property goes under various names in the literature: relative monotonicity in
(Nachbar, 1990), order-compatibility of pre-dynamics in (Friedman, 1991), monotonicity
in (Samuelson and Zhang, 1992), which we follow, and payoﬀ monotonicity in (Hofbauer
and Weibull, 1996).
14Instead of dynamics of type (33), Ritzberger and Weibull (1995) consider dynamics of
the more general type ˙ xi = hi(x), that need not leave the faces of the simplex positively
invariant. Thus, we only consider a subclass of their WSP dynamics.
19cycles developed by Hofbauer (1994) (a more accessible reference for this
result is theorem 17.5.1 in (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998)). Speciﬁcally, as-
sociate with the heteroclinic cycle Γ its so-called characteristic matrix. That
is, the 3 × 4 matrix whose entry in row i and column j is gj(ei) (for i 6= j,
this is the eigenvalue in the direction of ej of the linearization of the vector
ﬁeld at ei):
1 2 3 4
e1 0 g2(e1) g3(e1) g4(e1)
e2 g1(e2) 0 g3(e2) g4(e2)
e3 g1(e3) g2(e3) 0 g4(e3)
(note that gi(ei) = 0 because ei is a rest point of (33)).
Call C this matrix. If p is a real vector, let p < 0 (resp. p > 0) mean
that all coordinates of p are negative (resp. positive). Hofbauer (1994) shows
that if the following conditions are satisﬁed:
Γ is asymptotically stable within the boundary of S4
15 (34)
There exists a vector p in R4 such that p > 0 and Cp < 0 (35)
then Γ is asymptotically stable. Therefore, to prove proposition 10, it is
enough to show that for every α in ]0,1/3[, there exists  > 0 such that, for
every game in the neighborhood of (8), conditions (34) and (35) are satisﬁed.
We begin with a lemma. In the remainder of this section, i ∈ {1,2,3} and
i − 1 and i + 1 are counted modulo 3.
Lemma 6.1 For every 0 < α < 1/3, there exists  > 0 such that in the game
(8) and for every i in {1,2,3},
g4(ei) < 0 and 0 < gi+1(ei) < −gi−1(ei). (36)
Proof of lemma 6.1 for monotonic dynamics. For  > 0, at the vertex
ei, the payoﬀ of strategy 4 (resp. i + 1) is strictly smaller (greater) than
the payoﬀ of strategy i. Since the growth rate of strategy i at ei is 0, this
implies by monotonicity g4(ei) < 0 (resp. gi+1(ei) > 0). It remains to show
that gi+1(ei) < −gi−1(ei). For  = 0, we have: (Uei)i = (Uei)i+1 > (Uei)i−1
so that 0 = gi+1(ei) > gi−1(ei). Therefore gi+1(ei) < −gi−1(ei) and since
the dynamics depends continuously on the payoﬀ matrix, this still holds for
15That is, for each proper face (subsimplex) F of S4, if Γ
T
F is nonempty, then it is
asymptotically stable for the dynamics restricted to F.
20small positive .
Proof of lemma 6.1 for WSP dynamics. For concreteness, set i = 2. At
e2, strategy 4 earns less than average. Therefore g4(e2) < 0. Now consider
the case  = 0: at every point x in the (relative) interior of the edge [e1,e2],
strategy 3 earns strictly less than average hence its growth rate is negative.
By continuity at e2 this implies g3(e2) ≤ 0. Since at e2, strategy 1 earns
strictly less than average, it follows that g1(e2) < 0, hence g3(e2) < −g1(e2).
Since the dynamics depends continuously on the payoﬀ matrix, this still holds
for small positive .
To establish (36), it suﬃces to show that g3(e2) is positive for every suf-
ﬁciently small positive . Let  > 0. If λ > 0 is suﬃciently small then,
for all µ > 0 small enough, the unique strategy which earns weakly above
average at x = (λµ,1 − µ − λµ,µ,0) is strategy 3, hence gi(x) < 0 for
i 6= 3. Since
P
1≤i≤4 xigi(x) = 0, it follows that x1g1(x)+x3g3(x) > 0, hence
λµg1(x) + µg3(x) > 0, hence g3(x) > −λg1(x). By letting µ go to zero,
we obtain g3(e2) ≥ −λg1(e2) > 0 (g1(e2) < 0 was proved in the previous
paragraph).
We now prove proposition 10. Fix α and  as in lemma 6.1. Note that
since the dynamics we consider depends continuously on the payoﬀ matrix,
there exists a neighborhood of the game (8) in which the strict inequalities
(36) still hold. Thus, to prove proposition 10, it suﬃces to show that (36)
implies (34) and (35). Fix a game for which (36) holds.
Proof that condition (35) holds. It follows from (36) that g4(ei) is nega-
tive for all i in {1,2,3}. This implies that (35) holds (ﬁx p1 = p2 = p3 = −1
and take a very high p4).
Proof that condition (34) holds. To prove (34), i.e. asymptotic stability
of Γ on the boundary, we use again characteristic matrices. Let ˆ C denote
the 3 × 3 matrix obtained from C by eliminating the fourth column. This
corresponds to the characteristic matrix of Γ, when viewed as an heteroclinic
cycle of the underlying 3 × 3 RPS game. In this RPS game, the set Γ
is trivially asymptotically stable on the relative boundary of S3 (Γ is the
relative boundary!). Furthermore, for ˆ p = (1/3,1/3,1/3) > 0, the second
inequation in (36) implies that ˆ Cˆ p < 0. Therefore, it follows from theorem 1
21of Hofbauer (1994) that, in the 4×4 initial game, Γ is asymptotically stable
on the face spanned by e1,e2,e3. Asymptotic stability on the face spanned
by ei,ei+1,e4 is easy. This concludes the proof.
7 Robustness to the addition of mixed strate-
gies as new pure strategies
We showed that for many dynamics, there exists an open set of symmetric
4 × 4 games for which, from an open set of initial conditions, the unique
strategy used in correlated equilibrium is eliminated. Since we might not
want to rule out the possibility that individuals use mixed strategies, and that
mixed strategies be heritable, it is important to check whether our results
change if we explicitly introduce mixed strategies as new pure strategies of
the game. As explained in the introduction, the paradigm is the following:
there is an underlying normal-form game, called the base game, and a ﬁnite
number of types of agents. Each type plays a pure or mixed strategy of
the base game. We assume that each pure strategy of the base game is
played (as a pure strategy) by at least one type of agent, but otherwise
we make no assumptions on the agents’ types. The question is whether
we can nonetheless be sure that, for an open set of initial conditions, all
strategies used in correlated equilibrium are eliminated. This section shows
that the answer is positive, at least for the best-response dynamics and for
the replicator dynamics. We ﬁrst need some notations and vocabulary.
Let G be a ﬁnite game with strategy set I = {1,...,N} and payoﬀ matrix
U. A ﬁnite game G0 is said to be built on G by adding mixed strategies as
new pure strategies if:
First, letting I0 = {1,...,N,N + 1,...,N0} be the set of pure strategies of
G0 and U
0 its payoﬀ matrix, we may associate to each pure strategy i in I0 a
mixed strategy pi in SN in such a way that:
∀i ∈ I
0,∀j ∈ I
0,e
0
i · U
0e
0
j = p
i · Up
j (37)
where e0
i is the unit vector in SN0 corresponding to the pure strategy i.
Second, if 1 ≤ i ≤ N, the pure strategy i in the game G0 corresponds to
the pure strategy i in the base game G:
1 ≤ i ≤ N ⇒ p
i = ei. (38)
22If µ0 = (µ(k,l))1≤k,l≤N0 is a probability distribution over I0 × I0, then it
induces the probability distribution µ on I × I given by:
µ(i,j) =
X
1≤k,l≤N0
µ
0(k,l)p
k
ip
l
j ∀(i,j) ∈ I × I.
It follows from a version of the revelation principle (see Myerson, 1994) that,
if G0 is built on G by adding mixed strategies as new pure strategies, then
for any correlated equilibrium µ0 of G0, the induced probability distribution
on I × I is a correlated equilibrium of G. Thus, if G is a 4 × 4 symmetric
game with e4 ⊗ e4 as unique correlated equilibrium, then µ0 is a correlated
equilibrium of G0 if and only if, for every k,l in I0 such that µ0(k,l) is positive,
pk = pl = e4. Thus, the unique strategy of G used in correlated equilibria
of G0 is strategy 4. We show below that:
Proposition 11 For the replicator dynamics and for the best-response dy-
namics, there exists an open set of 4×4 symmetric games such that, for any
game G in this set:
(i) e4 ⊗ e4 is the unique correlated equilibrium of G
(ii) For any game G0 built on G by adding mixed strategies as new pure
strategies and for an open set of initial conditions, every pure strategy k in
I0 such that pk
4 > 0 is eliminated.
(the open set of initial conditions in property (ii) is a subset of SN0, the
simplex of mixed strategies of G0, and may depend on G0)16,17
For the best-response dynamics, proposition 11 follows from an easy and
very general result: for any ﬁnite game and in a sense made precise in the
next section, adding mixed strategies as new pure strategies does not modify
the behavior of the best-response dynamics.
16Our insistence on elimination of strategies k with pk
4 > 0, and not only of strategies
k with pk = e4, stems from the following consideration: an observer who could only see
which actions are taken by the agents, but not which pure or mixed strategies these actions
come from, could not be sure that strategies k with pk = e4 have been eliminated unless
he never observes action 4. This requires that all types of agents whose associated mixed
strategy puts positive probability on action 4 be eliminated.
17An observer cannot determine the current population proﬁle in SN0 from the actions of
the agents, but only the point in SN induced by the population proﬁle in SN0. So ideally,
we would like to show that there is an open subset of SN such that, for any interior
initial condition in SN0 inducing a point in this subset, all strategies used in correlated
equilibrium are eliminated. As should be clear from the next section, this is easy for
the best-response dynamics, but we do not know whether this holds for the replicator
dynamics.
237.1 Proof for the best-response dynamics
Let G be a ﬁnite game and let G0 be a ﬁnite game built on G by adding
mixed strategies of G as new pure strategies. We want to relate the behavior
of the best-response dynamics in the game G0 to its behavior in the base
game G. For this purpose, associate to each mixed strategy x0 in SN0 the
induced mixed strategy x in SN deﬁned by:
x :=
N0 X
k=1
x
0
kp
k. (39)
Let x0(·) be a solution of the best-response dynamics in G0 and x(·) the
induced mapping from R+ to SN.
Proposition 12 x(·) is a solution of the best-response dynamics in G.
Proof. For almost all t ≥ 0, there exists a vector b
0 ∈ BR(x0(t)) such that
˙ x
0(t) = b
0 − x0(t). Let b :=
P
k∈I0 b0
kpk ∈ SN. It follows from (39) that:
˙ x(t) =
N0 X
k=1
˙ x
0
kp
k =
N0 X
k=1
(b
0
k − x
0
k)p
k = b − x(t). (40)
Furthermore, since b
0 is a best response to x0(t) it follows from (37) and (38)
that b is a best response to x(t) (otherwise, letting i ∈ {1,...,N} be a best
response to x, we have: b
0 · U
0x0 = b · Ux < ei · Ux = e0
i · U
0x0, hence b
0 is
not a best response to x0, a contradiction). Together with (40), this implies
that, for almost all t, ˙ x ∈ BR(x) − x. The result follows.
Assume that G is a 4 × 4 symmetric game satisfying conditions (2), (5)
and (7) and let x0(0) be an initial condition in G0 to which strategy 4 is not
a best response and to which strategies 1, 2 and 3 are not all best responses.
Note that there is an open set of such initial conditions. It follows from
propositions 12 and 5 that x4(t) =
PN0
k=1 x0
k(t)pk
4 → 0 as t → +∞. This
implies that, for every k in I0 with pk
4 > 0, x0
k(t) → 0. Together with
corollary 2.1, this proves proposition 11 for the best-response dynamics.
7.2 Proof for the replicator dynamics
Recall that G0 denote the game of example 3 with α = 0 and U0 its payoﬀ
matrix. Note that in a game built on G0 by adding mixed strategies as new
24pure strategies, the heteroclinic cycle Γ0 : e0
1 → e0
2 → e0
3 → e0
1 need not be
asymptotically stable. Indeed (letting i ∈ {1,2,3} and counting i + 1 mod-
ulo 3), some of the added mixed strategies might be better responses to ei
than ei (e.g. (1 − λ)ei+1 + λe4, with λ small); this leads to instability near
ei. Nevertheless, we will show that every game close enough to G0 satisﬁes
property (ii) of proposition 11. Since, as already mentioned, every neighbor-
hood of G4 contains an open set of games with e4 ⊗ e4 as unique correlated
equilibrium, this implies that, for the replicator dynamics, elimination of all
strategies used in correlated equilibrium is indeed robust to the addition of
mixed strategies as new pure strategies, in the sense of proposition 11.
Before formally proving that games close to G0 satisfy (ii), we provide the
intuition: for a game G close to G0, the set Γ deﬁned in (9) is an attractor,
close to which strategy 4 earns less than average. Now consider a game G0
built on G by adding mixed strategies as new pure strategies, and a solution
of the replicator dynamics in G0: (a) as long as the share of strategies k ≥ 4
remains low, the solution remains close to the base-game attractor; (b) as long
as the solution is close to the base-game attractor, strategy 4 earns less than
average and its share decreases; (c) as long as the share of strategy 4 does not
increase, the share of strategies k ≥ 5 remains low, moreover, if the share of
strategy x4 decreases, so does, on average over time, the share of each added
mixed strategy in which strategy 4 is played with positive probability. The
latter follows from a basic property of the replicator dynamics18 and requires
that the share of the added strategies k ≥ 5 be initially low with respect to
the minimal share of the strategies played in the base-game attractor (1, 2
and 3). Putting (a), (b) and (c) together gives the result. Now to the details:
As in section 5, let E0 denote the convex hull of n = (1/3,1/3,1/3,0)
and e4. For x in S4\{e4}, let
V (x) := 3
(x1x2x3)1/3
x1 + x2 + x3
.
The function V takes its maximal value 1 on E0\{e4} and its minimal value
0 on the set {x ∈ S4\{e4} : x1x2x3 = 0}. Fix δ in ]0,1[. If V (x) ≤ δ then
x / ∈ E0, hence it follows from (26) that, at x, strategy 4 earns strictly less
than average. Together with a compactness argument, this implies that there
18Namely, the fact that the replicator dynamics is convex monotonic in the sense of
Hofbauer and Weibull (1996); loosely said, this amounts to not giving an advantage to
mixed strategies over pure ones.
25exists γ1 > 0 such that:
V (x) ≤ δ ⇒ [(U0x)4 − x · U0x ≤ −γ1]. (41)
Furthermore, it is shown in (Viossat, 2006) that in G0, under the replicator
dynamics, the function V (x) decreases strictly along interior trajectories (ex-
cept those starting in E0). More precisely, for every interior initial condition
x(0) / ∈ E0 and every t ∈ R, the function v0(t) := V (x(t)) satisﬁes ˙ v0(t) < 0.
Together with the compactness of {x ∈ S4\{e4},V (x) = δ}, this implies that
there exists γ2 > 0 such that
v0(t) = δ ⇒ ˙ v0(t) ≤ −γ2. (42)
Fix a 4 × 4 matrix U and a solution x(·) of the replicator dynamics with
payoﬀ matrix U, with x(0) 6= e4. Let v(t) := V (x(t)). Thus, the diﬀerence
between v0 and v is that the solution x(·) intervening in the deﬁnition of v
is a solution of the replicator dynamics for the payoﬀ matrix U and not for
U0. Since (Ux)4 −x·Ux and ˙ x are Lipschitz in U, it follows from (41) and
(42) that there exists γ > 0 such that, if ||U − U0|| < γ:
V (x) ≤ δ ⇒ [(Ux)4 − x · Ux ≤ −γ] (43)
and
v(t) = δ ⇒ ˙ v(t) ≤ −γ. (44)
Fix a game G with payoﬀ matrix U such that ||U − U0|| < γ. Let G0 be a
game built on G by adding mixed strategies of G as new pure strategies, and
let U
0 be its payoﬀ matrix. For x0 in SN0 such that x0
1 + x0
2 + x0
3 > 0, let
V
0(x
0) := 3
(x0
1x0
2x0
3)1/3
x0
1 + x0
2 + x0
3
.
Consider a solution x0(·) of the replicator dynamics in G0 (with
P
1≤i≤3 x0
i(0) >
0) and let v0(t) = V 0(x0(t)). On the face of SN0 spanned by the strategies of
the original game:
{x ∈ SN0 :
X
1≤i≤4
x
0
i = 1},
the replicator dynamics behaves just as in the base-game. Therefore, (43)
and (44) imply trivially that:
"
X
1≤i≤4
x
0
i = 1 and V
0(x) ≤ δ
#
⇒ [(U
0x
0)4 − x
0 · U
0x
0 ≤ −γ] (45)
26and "
X
1≤i≤4
x
0
i = 1 and v
0(t) = δ
#
⇒ ˙ v
0(t) ≤ −γ. (46)
Now deﬁne ¯ x0 ∈ SN0 as the projection of x on the face of SN0 spanned by the
strategies of the original game. That is,
¯ x
0
i =
x0
i P
1≤j≤4 x0
j
if 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, and ¯ x
0
i = 0 otherwise.
Note that V 0(x0) = V (x). Furthermore, a simple computation shows that
max
1≤i≤N0 |x
0
i − ¯ x
0
i| ≤ N
0 max
5≤k≤N0 x
0
k.
Therefore, since (U
0x0)4 − x0 · U
0x0 and the vector ﬁeld ˙ x
0 are Lipschitz in
x0, it follows from (45) and (46) that there exist positive constants η and γ0
such that

max
5≤k≤N0 x
0
k ≤ η and V
0(x
0) ≤ δ

⇒ (U
0x
0)4 − x
0 · U
0x
0 ≤ −γ
0 (47)
and 
max
5≤k≤N0 x
0
k ≤ η and v
0(t) = δ

⇒ ˙ v
0(t) ≤ −γ
0. (48)
Fix y0 ∈ SN0 such that
X
1≤i≤4
y
0
i = 1,V (y
0) < δ and C := min
1≤i≤3
y
0
i > 0.
There exists an open neighborhood Ω of y in SN0 such that
∀x
0 ∈ Ω,

min
1≤i≤3
x
0
i > C/2, max
5≤k≤N0 x
0
k < Cη/2, and V
0(x
0) < δ

.
Consider an interior solution x0(·) of the replicator dynamics in G0 with initial
condition in Ω. Recall that pk denote the mixed strategy of G associated
with the pure strategy k of G0. To prove proposition 11 for the replicator
dynamics, it suﬃces to show that:
Proposition 13 For all k in {4,...,N0} such that pk
4 > 0, x0
k(t) →t→+∞ 0.
Proof. We begin with two lemmas:
27Lemma 7.1 Let T > 0 and k ∈ {5,...,N0}. If x0
4(T) ≤ x0
4(0) then x0
k(T) <
η.
Proof. By construction of G0, strategy k ∈ I0 earns the same payoﬀ as the
mixed strategy
P
1≤i≤4 pk
ie0
i:
(U
0x
0)k =
X
1≤i≤4
p
k
i(U
0x
0)i ∀x
0 ∈ S
0
N.
Therefore, it follows from the deﬁnition of the replicator dynamics that:
˙ x0
k
x0
k
=
X
1≤i≤4
p
k
i
˙ x0
i
x0
i
.
Integrating between 0 and T and taking the exponential of both members
leads to:
x
0
k(T) = x
0
k(0)
Y
1≤i≤4

x0
i(T)
x0
i(0)
pk
i
. (49)
Noting that for 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, we have x0
i(T) ≤ 1 and 1 ≤ 1/x0
i(0) ≤ 2/C, we
get:
Y
1≤i≤3

x0
i(T)
x0
i(0)
pk
i
≤
Y
1≤i≤3

2
C
pk
i
=

2
C
1−pk
4
≤
2
C
. (50)
Since furthermore x0
k(0) < Cη/2, we obtain from (49) and (50):
x
0
k(T) <
Cη
2
2
C

x0
4(T)
x0
4(0)
pk
4
= η

x0
4(T)
x0
4(0)
pk
4
. (51)
The result follows.
Lemma 7.2 For all t > 0, maxk∈{5,...,N0} x0
k(t) < η and v0(t) < δ.
Proof. Otherwise there is a ﬁrst time T > 0 such that maxk∈{5,...,N0} x0
k(T) =
η or v0(T) = δ (or both). It follows from (47) and the deﬁnition of the
replicator dynamics that if 0 ≤ t ≤ T then ˙ x0
4(t) ≤ −γ0 < 0. Therefore
x0
4(T) ≤ x0
4(0). By lemma 7.1, this implies that maxk∈{5,...,N0} x0
k(T) < η.
Therefore, v0(T) = δ. Due to (48), this implies that ˙ v0(T) < 0. Therefore,
there exists a time T1 with 0 < T1 < T such that v0(T1) > δ, hence a time T2
with 0 < T2 < T1 < T such v0(T2) = δ, contradicting the minimality of T.
28We now conclude: it follows from lemma 7.2, equation (47) and the deﬁ-
nition of the replicator dynamics that for all t ≥ 0, x0
4(t) ≤ exp(−γ0t)x0
4(0).
By (51) this implies that for every k in {5,...,N0},
∀t ≥ 0,xk(t) < η exp(−γ
0p
k
4t).
Therefore, if pk
4 > 0 then x0
k(t) → 0 as t → +∞.
8 Discussion
We showed that elimination of all strategies used in correlated equilibrium
is a robust phenomenon, in that it occurs for many dynamics, an open set of
games and an open set of initial conditions. Furthermore, at least for some of
the leading dynamics, the results are robust to the addition of mixed strate-
gies as new pure strategies. It is relatively easy to prove some other forms
of robustness, e.g. robustness to discretization or perturbation of the vector
ﬁeld (Viossat, 2005, chapter 10a). Furthermore, under the replicator dynam-
ics, the best-response dynamics or the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics,
for appropriate values of the payoﬀs in game (8), the basin of attraction of the
Nash equilibrium can be made arbitrarily small, and the minimal distance
from the attractor on the face x4 = 0 to the basin of attraction of the Nash
equilibrium much larger than the minimal distance from the Nash equilib-
rium to the basin of attraction of the attractor on the face x4 = 0. It follows
that this attractor would be stochastically stable in a model ` a la Kandori,
Mailath and Rob (1993).19,20 These results show a sharp diﬀerence between
evolutionary dynamics and “adaptive heuristics” such as no-regret dynamics
(Hart and Mas-Collel, 2003; Hart, 2005) or hypothesis testing (Young, 2004,
chapter 8).
Some limitations of our results should however be stressed. First, our
results hold only for single-population dynamics. Of course, they imply that
19The (unperturbed) dynamics used by Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) is a discrete-
time version of the best-response dynamics, but it could easily be replaced by a discrete-
time version of another dynamics.
20For BNN, it is not known whether in a RPS game, there is a unique limit cycle or
if there are several; but there is an asymptotically stable annulus (Berger and Hofbauer,
2006). So for BNN, what we mean by “attractor on the face x4 = 0 is this asymptotically
stable annulus.
29for some games and some interior initial conditions, two-population dynam-
ics eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibrium21; but maybe not
for an open set of games nor for an open set of initial conditions.
Second, the monotonic and weakly sign-preserving dynamics of section 6
are non-innovative: strategies initially absent do not appear. This has the
eﬀect that, even when focusing on interior initial conditions, the growth of
the share of the population playing strategy i is limited by the current value
of this share. This is appropriate if we assume that agents have to meet
an agent playing strategy i to become aware of the possibility of playing
strategy i; but in general, as discussed by e.g. Swinkels (1993, p.459), this
seems more appropriate in biology than in economics. While our results
hold also for some important innovative dynamics, such as the best-response
dynamics and a family of dynamics including the Brown-von Neumann-Nash
dynamics, more general results would be welcome.
Third, in the games we considered, the unique correlated equilibrium
is a strict Nash equilibrium, and is thus asymptotically stable under most
reasonable dynamics, including all those we studied. Thus, even though
the unique strategy used in correlated equilibrium is eliminated for many
initial conditions, there is still an important connection between correlated
equilibrium and the outcome of evolutionary dynamics.
For Nash equilibrium, these three limitations can be overcome, at least
partially: there are wide classes of multi-population innovative dynamics for
which there exists an open set of games such that, for an open set of ini-
tial conditions, all strategies belonging to the support of at least one Nash
equilibrium are eliminated (Viossat, 2005, chapter 11). Moreover, for the
single-population replicator dynamics or the single-population best-response
dynamics, there are games for which, for almost all initial conditions, all
strategies used in Nash equilibrium are eliminated (Viossat, 2005, chapter
12). Whether these results extend to correlated equilibrium is an open ques-
tion.
21This is because for symmetric two-player games with symmetric initial conditions,
two-population dynamics reduce to single-population dynamics, at least for the replicator
dynamics, the best-response dynamics and the Brown-von-Neumann Nash dynamics.
30A Proof of proposition 4
We provide two proofs, as they provide diﬀerent insights. The ﬁrst one,
in the spirit of section 6, consists in checking that the suﬃcient conditions
for asymptotic stability of heteroclinic cycles given by Hofbauer (1994) are
satisﬁed. The second proof, in the spirit of the proof of proposition 4 in
(Viossat, 2006) exhibits an average Lyapunov function.22 In both proofs,
i ∈ {1,2,3} and i + 1 and i − 1 are counted modulo 3.
Proof 1. We use the tools introduced at the beginning of the proof of
proposition 10 (up to lemma 6.1). The heteroclinic cycle Γ is asymptotically
stable on the boundary of S4: asymptotic stability on the face spanned by
e1,e2,e3 follows from (5), as shown by Zeeman (1980); asymptotic stability
on the face spanned by ei,ei+1,e4 is easy. Furthermore, under the replicator
dynamics, the characteristic matrix C of Γ has the sign structure:
1 2 3 4
e1 0 − + −
e2 + 0 − −
e3 − + 0 −
.
It follows that there exists a vector p in R4 such that p > 0 and Cp < 0
(ﬁx p1 = p2 = p3 = 1 and take a very high p4). By theorem 1 of Hofbauer
(1994), this implies that Γ is asymptotically stable.
Proof 2 (sketch). Applying lemma 7 from Zeeman (1980) in the spirit
of (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998, proof of theorem 7.7.2), we may assume
without loss of generality that there exists a positive constant c such that
bi − ai+1 = c for i = 1,2,3. Let p ∈ S3 denote the Nash equilibrium of the
underlying RPS game and let V (x) =
Q
1≤i≤3 ˆ x
pi
i (where ˆ xi = xi/(1 − x4)).
The function ˙ V /V extends to a continuous function on S4 which is strictly
negative on Γ (more precisely, if x4 = 0, then ˙ V = −cV
P
1≤i≤3(xi − pi)2;
see Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998, proof of theorem 7.7.2). This implies that
V decreases exponentially in the neighborhood of Γ. The only diﬀerence
with the proof of proposition 4 in (Viossat, 2006) is then that W(x) =
max(x4,V (x)) is no longer a local Lyapunov function (because x4 need not
decrease everywhere in the neighbourhood of Γ) but only a local average
22Our ﬁrst proof relies on theorem 1 of Hofbauer (1994), which itself relies on the
construction of an (average) Lyapunov function; however this average Lyapunov function
is not explicit.
31Lyapunov function (it decreases in average over an approximate cycle). We
only give the heuristic argument: there exists a neighbourhood Ni of ei in
which strategy 4 earns strictly less than the mean payoﬀ, so that x4 decreases.
As long as x(t) is close enough to Γ, V (x(t)) decreases and the solution
describes a cycling movement from N1 to N2 to N3 and back to N1. During
this (approximate) cycle, most of the time23 is spent in the Ni, so that x4
decreases over the cycle. This allows to show that for every δ > 0, there
exists δ0 > 0 such that if W(x(0)) ≤ δ0 then W(x(t)) ≤ δ for all t ≥ 0 and
W(x(t)) → 0 as t → +∞.
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